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Summary 
 
The globalisation of economic activity and the growing importance of multinational 
corporations have far-reaching consequences for national tax policies. Since 1995, the 
average corporate tax rate in the EU has fallen from 35% to 23%. In addition, 
differences and incompatibilities between the national systems of corporate income 
taxation distort investment, complicate the tax system and give rise to conflicts between 
taxpayers and tax authorities as well as between tax authorities of different countries. 
Given this, there is a widespread view that greater coordination of corporate taxation is 
required. Recently, the European Commission proposed introducing a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) in Europe. This article discusses the 
economic advantages and the drawbacks of the CCCTB concept.  
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1. Corporate taxation and the globalisation of economic activity  
The globalisation of economic activity and the growing importance of multinational 
corporations have far-reaching consequences for national tax policies. From a global 
perspective, investment should be located where it is most productive, not where taxes 
are low. Ideally, the decisions of firms as to where to locate their activity should not be 
affected by taxes, but for a company taxes are costs, and companies may choose 
investment locations to avoid high taxes.  
For national governments, the increasing mobility of investment and jobs across 
borders is cause for concern. One way of attempting to attract such investment is to 
reduce tax rates on corporate income and this has proved enormously popular in the 
EU over the last two decades. Since 1995, the average corporate tax rate in the EU has 
fallen from 35% to 23%. Views about the economic consequences of this downward 
trend in tax rates are divided but, if it continues, revenue collected from corporate 
income taxes will eventually disappear. 
Another very significant problem in the taxation of international profit is deciding 
where that profit arises. If corporations operate in more than one jurisdiction the right to 
tax the profits of the corporation has to be divided between the jurisdictions where the 
firm operates. Some coordination is needed, for instance, to avoid profits being taxed 
twice or not at all. The usual approach to assigning the right to tax profits of a 
multinational firm is to treat the entities of the firm operating in different countries as 
separate firms for purposes of taxation. This approach is usually referred to as the 
method of separate accounting.  
Applying the method of separate accounting for purposes of taxation raises a 
number of difficulties, though, as there are many ways in which multinational companies 
can shift profits to countries with lower tax rates. For example, where transactions occur 
between different entities of a multinational firm, the firm is largely able to choose the 
transfer prices for goods or services delivered. Tax authorities can challenge transfer 
prices: the basic approach normally used is that the prices chosen should match prices 
which would be chosen by unrelated firms. In practice, however, there may be no such 
transactions. Similar incentives exist with respect to other decisions, such as the use of 
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debt finance or the location of immaterial assets like patents. Several recent studies of 
firm behaviour conducted at the Centre for Business Taxation suggest that firms 
respond to these incentives. In a recent study based on balance sheet data from 16 000 
multinational firms, Maffini and Mokkas (2009) show that firms systematically report 
higher productivity in low-tax countries. Another study, which uses similar data, shows 
that multinational firms tend to locate patent ownership in low-tax countries, rather than 
in the country where the research, which led to the patent, was carried out (Karkinsky 
and Riedel, 2009). Many countries have introduced special rules to attempt to prevent 
profit shifting to other countries, but their effectiveness is limited and many of these 
rules have created new problems by considerably increasing the complexity of the tax 
system.  
Overall, differences and incompatibilities between the national systems of 
corporate income taxation distort investment, complicate the tax system and give rise to 
conflicts between taxpayers and tax authorities as well as between tax authorities of 
different countries. Given this, there is a widespread view that greater coordination of 
corporate taxation is required. At the international level, efforts to coordinate corporate 
taxation on a multilateral basis have been largely unsuccessful. Within the European 
Union, coordination in setting corporate taxes has also been difficult to achieve, but 
some important steps have been taken and proposals for more coordination have been 
intensively debated. 
2. Corporate tax coordination in the European Union 
According to the EU Treaty, EU Member States have full autonomy in the field of direct 
taxation, which includes corporate income taxation. This autonomy of Member States to 
set their corporate taxes is limited only insofar as national taxes must be compatible 
with EU law. In particular, national tax law should not create obstacles for cross-border 
economic transactions.  
The debate on corporate tax coordination in the EU goes far beyond the legal 
requirement to remove obstacles to cross-border investment or trade. There are a 
number of reasons for a closer coordination of corporate tax policies in the European 
Union, such as:  
3 
 
• Companies operating in the EU currently have to deal with 27 different national 
tax systems, which gives rise to high compliance and administration costs. 
• Differences in effective tax burdens across Member States distort economic 
activity in the EU. 
• The growing importance of multinational companies makes it increasingly difficult 
to collect corporate tax based on separate accounting systems.  
• Conflicts arise between national tax policies and EU law. In a number of cases, 
the European Court of Justice has declared national tax rules to be incompatible 
with EU law, in particular with the freedom of establishment granted by the EC 
Treaty.  
 
Since the foundation of the EU, the European Commission has started several 
initiatives to coordinate corporate taxation. In 1975, 1984 and 1992 it has also submitted 
proposals for directives that would provide some harmonisation of corporate tax rates 
and bases, but most Member States were very reluctant to give up some of their 
sovereignty in the field of corporate taxation, so the Commission eventually decided to 
withdraw its proposals. In its report on ‘Company Taxation in the Internal Market’ 
(2001), the Commission took a new initiative and proposed various options for the 
coordination of corporate income taxation in the European Union (EU), which included 
the project of introducing a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). The 
ensuing debate has largely focused on the CCCTB proposal. The CCCTB would: 
i. introduce a common set of rules for the calculation of corporate profits 
throughout the EU;  
ii. introduce full consolidation, so that companies would have to determine 
only their total EU-wide profit, rather than the profit they generate in each 
Member State;  
iii. allocate a company’s EU-wide taxable profit to individual Member States, 
based on a geographical distribution of the company’s economic activity; 
iv. each Member State would be free to set its own tax rate on its allocated 
share of profit.  
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The following explains and discusses some of the key elements of the proposal 
and discusses its economic implications. 
3. Tax coordination in Europe: the project of a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
In 2004, the European Commission created a working group to study and discuss 
options for introducing a CCCTB in the EU. Although a final detailed proposal has not 
yet been submitted, the concepts developed by the working group suggest that such a 
proposal would have the following main features.  
a) Common rules for determining taxable profits 
The CCCTB would introduce a common set of rules for the calculation of taxable profits 
of companies operating in EU Member States participating in the CCCTB. The common 
tax base would be consolidated, which means that companies or corporate groups 
would be taxed on the basis of their overall income in all countries. Among other things, 
this has the important implication that losses made in one country would be offset 
against profits made in another country. It also implies that all countries participating in 
the CCCTB would have to agree on common rules for taxing foreign source income and 
common ways of protecting the common tax base against income shifting to third 
countries. 
b) CCCTB is optional 
Companies would have the option to be taxed under the CCCTB rules or to remain in 
the existing national systems. This implies that two regimes for corporate taxation would 
coexist, at least for a transition phase. 
c) Member States may set corporate income tax rates 
The Member States would retain the autonomy to set their tax rates. For some Member 
States, preserving autonomy in setting tax rates is a key condition for their willingness to 
support the proposals. 
d) Formula apportionment 
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Multinational firms participating in the CCCTB regime would no longer be taxed on the 
basis of profits generated in individual Member States, but rather on the basis of EU-
wide profits. A key question is how the right to tax this base would be divided between 
the countries where the firm operates. The solution proposed is a sharing mechanism 
usually referred to as ‘formula apportionment’, i.e. the tax base would be apportioned to 
the Member States according to a formula based on the distribution across Member 
States of the companies’ payroll, employees, assets and sales across countries. The 
formula would be the same for all Member States participating in the CCCTB.  
It is useful to illustrate this with a simple example. Suppose that a firm operates 
in France and the UK. It has 30 employees in France and 60 in the UK. Wages are the 
same in the two countries and sales as well as assets in the UK are also twice as high 
in the UK as in France. Suppose further that, due to differences in other costs like e.g. 
office rents, communications, etc., the firm makes a loss of 10 in the UK and a profit
How would this firm be taxed under the current tax system and how would it be 
taxed under the CCCTB?  
 of 
40 in France. Finally suppose, for the purposes of exposition, that the French tax rate is 
30% and the UK tax rate is 25%.  
• Under the current national corporate tax system, the profit of 40 generated in 
France, would be fully taxed in France and the firm would have to pay taxes of 12 
to the French tax authorities. In the UK, the firm would pay no taxes and it could 
carry forward its loss to set against profits generated in the future.  
• Under the CCCTB, the EU-wide tax base of the firm would be consolidated, 
which means that EU-wide profits are equal to 30. Since two-thirds of the firm’s 
employees, payroll, assets and sales are located in the UK, two-thirds of the EU-
wide tax base would be allocated to the UK, so that a profit of 20 would be taxed 
at the UK tax rate of 25%, whereas the remaining 10 would be taxed by the 
French government, at the French tax rate of 30%. The firm’s overall tax 
payments would be equal to 8, tax revenue in the UK would be 5 and tax 
revenue in France would be 3.  
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This example shows that a switch from the current tax systems to the CCCTB 
could have drastic implications for the overall tax burden as well as the distribution of 
tax revenue across countries.  
Although the introduction of formula apportionment would bring about a major 
change to the international tax system, the approach as such is not new. It is currently 
used in many federal countries, such as Germany, Canada or the US, for purposes of 
taxing corporate profit at the state or local level.   
4. Is the CCCTB a solution to the problem of corporate income 
tax coordination in the European Union? 
The introduction of a CCCTB in the EU would imply a fundamental change in the 
system of corporate income taxation. The Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation has carried out a number of studies which have contributed to this debate. The 
role of legal and accounting principles for the design of the new tax base are discussed 
in Freedman and MacDonald (2008). This study argues that a possible directive 
introducing a CCCTB would have to build on existing international accounting 
standards, which would have to be combined with new tax rules. An assessment of the 
pros and cons of the project from an economic perspective can be found in Fuest 
(2008). What are these pros and cons? Introducing the CCCTB would bring significant 
advantages. It would mean that firms would no longer have to deal with 27 different 
national tax systems. This would probably reduce the compliance costs, although this 
claim has been disputed. Another significant advantage would be that using transfer 
prices or financing structures to shift profits within the EU in order to reduce overall tax 
liabilities would no longer be possible. 
However, there are also some drawbacks. First, shifting profits to low-taxed 
countries outside the EU would still be possible as long as other countries maintained a 
system of separate accounting. Indeed, the EU as a whole would also maintain 
separate accounting with respect to profits earned in the rest of the world. Secondly, 
consolidation of profit may create new distortions, as firms with profits in high-tax 
countries would have incentives to acquire loss-making firms in low-tax countries. 
Thirdly, tax rate differences would also continue to distort economic activity in the 
European internal market. The nature of the distortions would change because 
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incentives would be different (Devereux and Loretz, 2008). For example, if employment 
is an important factor in the allocation of profit to Member States, then an incentive 
would be created to locate employment in countries with low tax rates. Fourthly, as 
shown by Devereux and Loretz (2007), introducing the CCCTB would give rise to a 
redistribution of corporate tax revenue across the Member States. Member States which 
lose revenue will be reluctant to accept this or will ask for compensation. 
How the introduction of CCCTB would affect tax competition and tax-rate setting 
by Member States is also an open question. It is clear that the pressure to cut tax rates 
would continue, but it is difficult to assess whether it would be stronger or weaker than 
under the current system.  
Overall, there is a widespread view amongst individual Member States that the 
benefits of the CCCTB would not be large enough to be worth the considerable effort 
involved. At the same time, though, the shortcomings of existing corporate income 
taxation in the EU persist and the process of tax competition shows no signs of abating. 
Unless some agreed solution can be found – whether the CCCTB or another option – 
then the EU may find that the long-term result may ultimately be that tax rates fall so far 
that this tax ceases to raise any significant revenue.  
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